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Abstract
Secure property rights are considered a key determinant of economic development. However, the evaluation 
of the causal effects of land titling is a difficult task. The Brazilian government through a program called “Papel 
Passado” has issued titles, since 2004, to over 85,000 families and has the goal to reach 750,000. This paper 
examines the direct impact of securing a property title on the supply of work hours and income. In order to isolate 
the causal role of ownership security, this study uses a comparison between two close and very similar communities 
in the City of Osasco. The key point of this case is that some units get the program and others do not. One of 
them, Jardim Canaã, was fortunate to receive the titles in 2007, the other, Jardim DR, given fiscal constraints, 
only will be part of the program schedule in 2011, and for that reason became the control group. The estimates, 
generated using Difference-in-Difference econometric technique, suggest that titling results in a increase of adult 
labor supply and income for the families that received the title compared to the others. Such remarks can provide 
a relevant subsidize regarding future public tools to approach informality and affect economic growth.
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Resumo
A obtenção dos direitos de propriedade é considerada um determinante para o desenvolvimento econômico. 
Entretanto, a avaliação dos efeitos do título de propriedade é uma tarefa difícil. O Governo Brasileiro, por 
meio do programa intitulado “Papel Passado”, vem concedendo escrituras desde 2004 para mais de 85.000 
famílias e ainda objetiva alcançar a marca de 750.000 famílias beneficiadas. Este artigo examina o impacto 
direto da obtenção do título de propriedade sobre o aumento de horas de trabalho e renda. A fim de isolar 
o papel causal do título concedido, o estudo utiliza uma comparação entre duas comunidades vizinhas na 
cidade de Osasco. O ponto chave, entretanto, é que uma das comunidades, Jardim Canaã, foi beneficiada 
pelo programa em 2007 e a outra, Jardim DR, devido a restrição orçamentária do governo, só fará parte do 
programa em 2011, e por este motivo tornou-se o grupo de controle. As estimações, geradas a partir da técnica 
econométrica Difference-in-Difference, sugerem o aumento das horas de trabalho e renda para as famílias que 
obtiveram os títulos, comparativamente aos indivíduos do grupo de controle. Tais observações podem prestar 
um relevante subsídio em relação a futuras políticas públicas com abordagem sobre informalidade, afetando 
assim o crescimento econômico.
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Introduction
The role played by private rights in the 
economic development of the Western world 
has been powerfully documented by economic 
historians such as North e Thomas (1973). The 
fragility of property rights is considered a crucial 
obstacle for the economic development (NORTH, 
1990). The main argument is that individuals 
underinvested if others can seize the fruits of their 
investment (DEMSETZ, 1967). Torstensson (1994) 
and Goldsmith (1995) found a significantly positive 
association between secure property rights and 
economic growth.
In such context, strengthening economic 
institutions is widely argued to foster investment 
in physical and human capital, bolster growth 
performance, reduce macroeconomic volatility and 
encourage an equitable and efficient distribution of 
economic opportunity (ACEMOGLU et al., 2002). In 
the current developing world scenario, a pervasive 
sign of feeble poverty rights are the 930 million 
people living in urban dwellings without possessing 
formal titles of the plots of land they occupy (United 
Nations, Habitat Report, 2005). The lack of formal 
property rights constitutes a severe limitation for the 
poor. The absence of formal titles creates constraints 
to use land as collateral to access the credit markets 
(BESLEY, 1995).
De Soto (2000) emphasizes that the lack 
of property rights limits the transformation of the 
wealth owned by the poor into capital. Proper 
titling could allow the poor to collateralize the 
land. Field e Torero (2002) mentioned that this 
credit could be invested as capital in productive 
projects, promptly increasing labor productivity 
and income. Among policy-makers as well, 
property titling is increasingly considered one of 
the most effective forms for targeting the poor and 
encouraging economic growth (BAHAROGLU, 
2002; BINSWANGER et al., 1995) as translated 
in the Figure 1 below.
The most famous example is Peru in 
Latin America. The Peruvian government issued 
property titles to 1.2 million urban households 
during the 1990’s. In Asia, millions of titles are 
being issued in Vietnam and Cambodia as shown 
in the Thel Economist magazine in March 15th 
2007 edition. The same edition brings in the front 
page: “Property Rights: China’s Next Revolution”. 
The survey shows that China intends to put into 
place the most ambitious land-titling program in 
the World’s History and includes such initiative as 
one of the main points of the Chinese economic 
development model.
In Brazil, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
announced during his first week in the office, 
back in 2003, a massive plan to title 750,000 
families all over the country. The Brazilian Federal 
Government created a program called “Papel 
Passado”. Since launched, the program has spent 
US$ 15 million per year from the Federal Budget, 
providing titles to over 85,000 and reaching 49 
cities in 17 different Brazilian states. The official 
goal of the program is “to develop land title in 
Brazil and promote an increase in quality of life 
for the Brazilian population”. However, the country 
still faces a very difficult scenario regarding land 
property rights: the Brazilian government estimates 
that 12 million people live under illegal urban 
conditions (IBGE, 2007).
This paper investigates the impact of property 
rights on labor markets in an emerging economy 
such as Brazil by analyzing household response 
regarding income and supply of labor force to an 
exogenous changes in formal ownership status. 
In particular, the paper assesses the value to a 
squatter household of increases in tenure security 
associated with obtaining a property title in terms 
of hours of labor supply and level of income.
Effects of land titling have been documented 
by several studies. A partial listing includes 
Jimenez (1985), Alston et al. (1996) and Lanjouw 
e Levy (2002) on real estate values. Besley (1995), 
Jacoby et al. (2002), Brasselle et al. (2002) and 
Do e Iyer (2003) on agricultural investment. Place 
e Migot-Adholla (1998), Carter e Olinto (2003) 
and Field e Torero (2002) on credit access, housing 
investment and income.
13
In urban settings, the value of property titles 
has been measured far less often and empirical 
work has focused on real estates prices. A major 
contribution is from the of paper by Jimenez 
(1984), involving an equilibrium model of urban 
squatting in which it is shown that the difference 
in unit housing prices between non-squatting 
(formal) sector of a city and its squatting (informal) 
sector reflects the premium associated with 
security. The accompanying empirical analysis of 
real estate markets in Philippines finds equilibrium 
prices differentials between formal and informal 
sector unit dwelling prices in the range of 58.0% 
and greater for lower income groups and larger 
households.
For Besley (1995), the findings were 
ambiguous, land rights appear to have a positive 
effect on agricultural investment in the Ghananian 
region of Angola but less noticeable impact on 
the region of Wassa. Using a similar approach, 
Jacoby et al. (2002) find positive effects in China, 
where as Brasselle et al. (2002) find no effects for 
Burkina Faso. Field e Torero (2002), in Peru, exploits 
timing variability in the regional implementation of 
the Peruvian titling program using cross-sectional 
data on past and future title recipients midway 
through the project, and also finds positive effects, 
particularly in the credit access and housing 
investments. In Brazil, Andrade (2006) using cross-
section data from a sample of 200 families of the 
Comunidade do Caju, an urban poor community 
in Rio de Janeiro, has demonstrated an increase 
effect on the income of those that had received the 
land title.
A common obstacle, faced by all studies 
mentioned above, is how to measure the influence 
Figure 1. Land registration
Source: World Bank, 2008.
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of tenure security considering the potential 
endogeneity of ownership rights as pointed by 
Demsetz (1967) and Alchian e Demsetz (1973). 
Direct evidence of this is provided by Miceli et al. 
(2001), who analyze the extent of endogeneity of 
formal agricultural property rights in Kenya.
In order to isolate the causal role of 
ownership security, this study uses a natural 
experiment, basically a comparison between two 
neighbors and very similar communities in the City 
of Osasco (a town with 650,000 people located in 
the São Paulo - Brazil metropolitan area). Osasco 
is part of the Papel Passado’s map has 6,000 
families living under urban property informality. 
One of them, Jardim Canaã, was fortunate to 
receive the titles in 2007, the other, Jardim DR, only 
will be part of the program schedule in 2011, and 
for that reason became the control group. Such 
approach enables a comparison of households 
in a neighborhood reached by the program with 
households in a neighborhood not yet reached.
Furthermore, the present research, different 
from the previous studies, is based on a panel data, 
based on a random sample from Jardim Canaã 
and Jardim DR, and produced from a two-stage 
survey with focus on the property right issue. The 
first part of the survey was collected in March 2007, 
before titles had been issued to Jardim Canaã, 
and the second collected in August 2008, almost 
one year and half after the titles. As Ravallion et 
al. (2005) argues that the best ex-post evaluations 
are designed and implemented ex-ante - often 
side-by-side with the program itself.
And, based on the first survey, 95.0% of the 
survey participants (from Canaã and DR) were not 
aware about receiving land titles and the meaning 
of it (which avoids any behavior deviation generated 
by the expectation of having a land title). From the 
second stage of the survey, most of households 
that received the land title felt that such event was 
relevant for its life - see Figure 2 below even not 
previously expecting the land title.
Hence, an important contribution of this 
paper is the specific focus on non-agricultural 
households and the value to urban residents and 
their families of increased ownership security. As 
shown, in developing economies, large proportions 
of urban and rural residents alike lack tenure 
security. As Field e Torero (2002) demonstrated, 
presumably because of historic interests in 
agricultural investment and related politics of land 
reform, the majority of both academic and policy 
attention to property rights has centered on rural 
households tenure security. Nevertheless, in most 
of the developing world, the population - and 
a particularly the impoverished population - is 
increasingly urban.
Secondly, this research provides an unique 
panel data through a natural experiment that helps 
to minimize the endogeneity aspect related to most 
of the studies on such subject (property rights).
The data
The empirical analysis of household labor 
supply and income responses to changes in formal 
property rights relies on a data survey developed, 
especially and exclusive for this paper, in the City 
of Osasco, an important town in the São Paulo 
metropolitan area with a population of 654,000 
people.
The Federal Government has chosen 
Osasco, as one of the participants of the “Papel 
Passado”- a program that intends, as mentioned 
earlier in the paper, to provide land titles to families 
living under illegal conditions - given its relevant 
economic and social role.
Figure 2. How land title affected household’s life?
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
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The city of Osasco has 30,000 people 
(about 6,000 families) living under informal 
conditions, which represents almost 4.5% of 
its total population. The program timetable for 
Osasco establishes that all the communities under 
illegal situation will be part of the “Papel Passado” 
during the period between 2007 and 2014 (the 
main reason because all communities are not 
receiving the land title at the same time relies on 
the fact that fiscal resources are limited in time). 
Officially, as released by the Osasco City Hall, the 
priority follows random criteria. Unofficial sources 
from local communities in Osasco express the 
feelings that a “political” agenda is present in the 
decision.
Anyway, the first community to receive 
the land title was Jardim Canaã, in 2007, a 
place with 500 families. The closest neighbor of 
Jardim Canaã is a community called DR, with 
450 families. The DR’s households will be part of 
the “Papel Passado” program schedule in 2011. 
Hence, the data of this particular paper consist in 
326 households distributed across Jardim Canaã 
and DR (185 from Jardim Canaã and 141 from 
DR).
Minimizing endogeneity bias concerns
Given the particular nature of the research 
conducted in the city of Osasco, some steps were 
taken to minimize the bias related with the data 
collected.
First of all, a technique from Bolfarine e 
Bussab (2005) was used to choose randomly 326 
sample households. The approach was basically to 
choose the first 150 households (from the Canaã 
and DR) that have the closest birth dates (day and 
month) in comparison with the three field researchers 
that conducted the survey interviews (important 
to mention that the field researchers are not from 
Osasco). Each researcher got 50 names initially as 
first base. Additionally, after reaching each of those 
households, they could go and pick the third and 
the fifth neighbor on the right hand side.
Secondly, Heckman e Hotz (1989) states 
that constructing counterfactuals is the central 
problem in the literature evaluating social 
programs given the impossibility of observing the 
same person in both states at the same time. The 
goal of any program evaluation is to compare only 
comparable people. An important step to minimize 
such issue in this study was to use a comparison 
between those two neighbors (Jardim Canaã and 
DR) with very similar characteristics. Canaã and 
DR are not only official neighbors but there is 
no physical “borderline” among them, both are 
geographically united (if someone walks there, it 
is hard to identify the boundaries -- even for the 
local households).
One of them, Jardim Canaã, fortunate 
to receive the titles in 2007, is qualified, for the 
paper proposal, as the main sample. The other, 
DR, only part of the program schedule in 2011, 
became the control group. Such approach enables 
a comparison of households in a neighborhood 
reached by the program with households in a 
neighborhood not yet reached and gives the 
possibility to produce a panel data.
Another aspect to be mentioned about 
the data collected is that produced an unique 
match within same geographic area which helped 
to assure that comparison units come from the 
same economic environment. Rubin e Thomas 
(2000) indicate that impact estimates based on 
full (unmatched) samples are generally more 
biased, and less robust to miss-specification of the 
regression function, than those based on matched 
samples.
Given such conditions, it was produced 
from a two-stage survey focused on the property 
right issue. However, to minimize bias, the way 
that survey was prepared and conducted by the 
researchers does not provide any direct information 
for the households what exactly the research is 
about. Officially for the people interviewed, the 
study was about City of Osasco general living 
conditions.
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The survey was based on a 39 questions 
questionnaire applied to the 326 families randomly 
sample described above. The survey instrument, in 
many questions and methodologies, closely mirrors 
the IBGE Living Standards Measurement Survey (PNAD 
- Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicílios do 
Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística) in content, 
and therefore contains a variety of information on 
household and individual characteristics. In addition, 
there are six questions designed to provide information 
on the range of economic, social and personal benefits 
associated with property formalization.
The first stage of the survey was conducted in 
March 2007, before titles had been issued to Jardim 
Canaã, and the second collected in August 2008, 
almost one year and half after the first title issued 
(with exactly same households and with 98.0% of 
recall -- or 2.0% missing, which means, that almost 
all households interviewed in the first survey had been 
found and interviewed during the second stage). 
The reason regarding such time gap was to give the 
opportunity to all households interviewed during the 
first survey stage to have, at least, 1 year with the land 
title. The exactly dates that each household interviewed 
received the title were provided by the 2nd Cartório de 
Osasco (2nd Osasco’s Office of Registration) along 
with the formal authorization from the Osasco’s City 
Hall to conduct the research.
Heckman e Hotz (1989) add that is not 
necessary to sample the same persons in different 
periods -- just persons from the same population. This 
particular survey instrument design has clearly the 
advantage that the same households were tracked 
over time to form a panel data set Ravallion et al. 
(1995) argues that making a panel data with such 
characteristics should be able to satisfactorily address 
the problem of miss-matching errors from incomplete 
data, a very common issue regarding public policy 
evaluation.
Furthermore, it is also important to emphasize 
again another aspect that helps minimize the 
selection bias. Based on the first survey, 95.0% of 
the survey participants (from Canaã and DR) did 
not expect to receive any land title, i.e., they were 
not aware about “Papel Passado” and the meaning 
of it. Such lack of information about the subject 
provides the study a non-bias aspect regarding 
the importance of property rights because avoids 
a potential behavior deviation from households 
included in the program.
Finally, the study also tracks the households 
that moved outside both communities to check 
if the land title effect stands. From the original 
sample only 8.0% of the households that received 
the land title have moved away from Canaã (one 
of the main concerns from local authorities in 
Osasco was that most citizens would receive the 
land title, sell the property right away and return 
to an informal living conditions and that not has 
been materialized). From the control group, only 
1 household (out of 140) has moved during the 
same period.
Basic findings: hours worked and 
income
This study has used basically four questions 
to address the issues of labor supply and income: a) 
How many hours do you work each day?; b) How 
many days per week?; and only for the stage II (2008) 
c) These hours are greater, equal or lower to one 
year ago? From the sample, 52.0% answered that 
are working greater hours compared to the previous 
year, a percentage above if related with the 16.0% 
from the control group. If the households that moved 
after receiving the title are not included, the trend 
remains the same (53.0% from the sample declared 
to be working more hours). Also note that working-
age members who are not in the labor force and 
those who are but report not having worked during 
the previous month were assigned hours value 0.
Additionally, the diagram below summarizes 
the household’s answers (2007 and 2008) about 
weekly hours of work. The main issue that arises 
is related to the fact that for the sample is visible 
that working are working greater hours and for the 
control group the scenario remains almost constant 
overtime. Again, even excluding the ones that moved 
from Canaã, the overall picture does not change.
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Figure 3. Adult labor force hours worked weekly 
x number of households (sample - all households)
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
Figure 4. Adult labor force hours worked weekly 
x number of households (control group - all 
households)
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
The last question is related to income and 
was applied as follow using the table below: “Now, 
I will read some income groups and I would like you 
tell me what group is your monthly familiar income 
included. I mean, the sum of all people living in your 
home, including you. Your monthly familiar income 
(last month) was?”.
Table 1. “Income card” (SM = minimum wage)
1 Until R$ 380,00 Until 1 SM
2 R$ 381,00 to R$ 760,00 More than 1 to  2 SM
3 R$ 761,00 to R$ 1140,00 More than 2 to 3 SM
4 R$ 1141,00 to R$ 1.520,00 More than 3 to 4 SM
5 R$ 1.521,00 to R$ 2.660,00 More than 4 to 7 SM
6 R$ 2.660,00 to R$ 4.560,00 More than 7 to 12 SM
7 R$ 4.560,00 to R$ 8.740,00 More than 12 to 23SM
8 More than R$ 8.741,00 More than 23 SM
(exchange rate US$/R$-BRL was 1.77 in 12/31/2007 and 2.33 in 
12/31/2008. Source: Central Bank of Brazil).
The results have shown, please refer to the 
diagram below, that the sample group has advanced 
in terms of the distribution of minimum wage 
compared to the control group. 
Figure 5. Level of Income (# Minimum Wage) x 
Number of Households (Sample)
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
Figure 6. Level of income (# minimum wage) x 
number of households (Control Group)
Source: Research from the Osasco Land Title Survey – 2008.
The basic program effect interpretation of 
such picture is that titling program leads households 
(from sample that received the title) to shift outward 
their distribution of work and that generates a similar 
effect in terms of distribution of income level.
Econometric model: difference-in-
difference estimates
Difference-in-difference estimates: esti-
mator – general framework
The econometric method used was Difference-
in-Difference Estimate, known as DIFF-in-DIFF (DD), 
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given the data characteristics described above. 
As Bertrand et al. (2004) defines, Differences-
in-Differences consists of identifying a specific 
intervention or treatment (often a passage of a law). 
One then compares the difference in outcome after 
and before the intervention for groups affected by 
intervention to the same for unaffected groups.
Such approach involves basically two 
regimes: “0” and “1” given an observed outcome 
Y, which means Y₁= dY₁+(1-d)Y₀. Given d=1, we 
observe Y₁ and with d=0, Y₀ is observed.
As Heckman e Hotz (1989) stated that the 
parameter most commonly invoked in the program 
evaluation literature, although not the one actually 
estimated in social experiments is the effect of 
randomly picking a person with characteristics X 
and moving from “0” to “1”:
E(Y₁-Y₀/X)=E(Δ/X)
In practice, most non-experimental and 
experimental studies do not estimate E(Δ/X). 
Instead, studies usually estimate the effect of 
treatment on the treated.
E(Δ/X),d=1
Given the data characteristics, this particular 
study aims, as previously mentioned, to provide a 
comparison between “treated” and “untreated” to 
estimate impact of treatment on the treated with a 
counterfactual.
Again as Heckman e Hotz (1989) pointed, 
it is impossible to form change in outcomes 
between “treated” and “untreated” states for 
anyone. However, it is possible to form one or the 
other terms for everyone with the counterfactual 
mechanism.
Under such scenario, the current study also 
has the “before-after” estimator which incorporates 
time t on the model.
Let’s assume that the program/treatment 
occurs only at the time period k and t > k > t′.
Furthermore, yit is the “treated” group at 
period t, if i=1 and “untreated” if i=0. Additionally, 
consider d=1 is the “treated” group and d=0 the 
“untreated” group.
Hence, the main focus is to estimate the 
follow:
E(y1t – y0t|d = 1) = E(y1t – y0t)1
and given that, it is possible to decouple the 
equation above between “treated” and “untreated” 
given two different periods, or t > t′. The Difference-
in-Difference estimator is:
E(yit – y0t)1 = E(yit – y0t’)1 – E(y0t – y0t’)1 + E(y0t – 
y0t’)0 – E(y0t – y0t’)0
And, the assumption is:
E(y0t – y0t’)1 = E(y0t – y0t’)0
Which basically means the between periods t 
and t′, the variation of the “treated” and “untreated” 
averages are the same. Hence:
E(y1t – y0t)1 = E(y1t – y0t’)1 – E(y0t – y0t’)0
Given the fact that there is no treatment at 
t′, the “treated” differentiates from the “untreated” 
as (y₀t′|d=1)=y¹t′ and (y₀t|d=0)=y⁰t′. Following the 
equation above:
E(y₁t-y₀t)₁ = E[(y¹t-y¹t′) - (y⁰t-y⁰t′)] = 
E(Δy₁-y₀)
Finally, the estimator can expressed as follow:
Δy=dΔy₁+(1-d)Δy₀=Δy₀+d(Δy₁-y₀)
Given the case the Δyi = ΔXβi +ui, the 
regression is:
Δy=ΔXβ₀+d(ΔXβ₁-ΔXβ₀)+u₀+d(u₁-u₀)
Assuming that β₁-β₀=0, except for the constant, 
follows:
Δy=ΔXβ₀+dα+u₀+d(u₁-u₀)
and α is the focused parameter.
Difference-in-difference estimates: the 
regression model
Difference-in-Difference estimates and their 
standard error, according to Greene (2002), most 
often derive from using Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) in repeated cross sections (or a panel) data 
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on individuals in treatment and control groups (no 
treatment) for a period before and after a specific 
intervention. As Meyer (1995) argues that the great 
appeal of DD estimation comes from its simplicity 
as well its potential to circumvent many of the 
endogeneity problems that typically arise when 
making comparisons between individuals.
The standard DD estimates the following 
regression:
Yist=As+Bt+cXist+βIst+εist
Where As and Bt are fixed effects for states 
and years respectively, Xist are relevant individual 
controls and εist is a error term. The estimated 
impact of the intervention is the OLS estimate β. 
Standard errors used to form confidence interval 
for β are usually OLS standard errors sometimes 
corrected to account correlation of shocks within 
each year. Considering the data characteristics 
mentioned earlier, this study will assume that the 
estimated coefficient of intervention is variable 
(given Xist) but does not help to determine program 
participation (land title were given randomly and 
households were mostly unaware about receiving 
the title).
Hence, this specification is a common 
generalization of the most basic DD, and it will be 
the foundation for this particular study econometric 
technique. The basic assumption is that changes in 
outcome variable over time would have been exactly 
the same in both treatment and control group in the 
absence of intervention.
Difference-in-difference estimates: land 
title specification
In this paper, formally, the dependent variable 
is level of income (measured in number of minimum 
wages), Yist (the outcome of interest for household i 
in group s by time t). The dependent variable would 
be posted as the difference among level of income 
in 2008 and 2007.
Also, δ indicates whether the household lives 
in a neighborhood that has been reached by the 
program - being the dummy for whether the land 
title has affected the group s at the time t; with fixed 
effects and Xi is a vector of characteristic controls.
Hence, the coefficient δ is the estimated 
of program effect, which provides a measure of 
conditional average difference households level of 
income in program area versus the non-program 
area.
In addition, Xi includes the following controls: 
sex (dummy), marital status (dummy, example: single) 
and ethnicity (dummy, example: African Brazilian).
Another set of variables included, to extend 
to include fixed effects are: worked weekly hours. 
The number of household members and years 
of education of family’s head are also in. For 
weekly hours, years of education and number 
of household members, the difference between 
the survey collection results in 2008 and 2007 
is applied (example: the independent variable of 
weekly hours worked is = Weekly hours worked 
2008 - Weekly hours worked 2007 and so on with 
the other variable mentioned).
As a robustness check, this study also 
estimates a regression including the households 
that moved from Canaã (households that got the 
title, sold the property and moved right away). The 
goal is to check if the land title still has positive 
effect even considering those that are not living in 
the original community.
Given all the conditions mentioned above, 
the basic econometric structure is the following:
Yi = α+δ(Land title)+β(Hours worked 
weekly)+β(Households number)+β(Years of 
education)+α′Xi+ei
Furthermore, the main hypothesis to be tested 
is the following:
H₀=δ>0
H₁=δ≤0
Results
The summary of basic statistics results are 
presented in Table 2 (Sample Means). Consistent 
with the study basic findings, one main aspects 
demands special attention. The average weekly 
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hours has increased from the program households 
and remained the same for the non-program. 
Additionally, for land title owners, income level is 
higher.
Table 2. Sample means - with all households
Pre-Program
(N = 326)
Post-Program
(N = 310)
Ia
(pro-
gram)
Ib
(non-
-pro-
gram)
IC
|tΔ|
IIa
(pro-
gram)
IIb
(non-
-pro-
gram)
IIC|tΔ|
Mean age 39.0 42.4 -3.4 40.0 43.4 -3.4
Time in 
residency 
(months)
143.4 154.4 -11.0 155.8 170.2 -14.4
Household 
number (# 
members)
3.8 4.0 -0.2 3.9 4.0 -0.1
Number of 
rooms
3.3 3.6 -0.3 3.3 3.6 -0.4
Income 
(number of 
Minimum 
Wage)
1.8 3.1 -1.3 2.2 3.1 -0.9
Highest 
Grade 
Education
3.4
1.6 1.8 3.5 1.8 1.7
Hours 
Worked 
Weekly
10.6 10.1 0.5 20.4 11.2 9.3
Source: Author’s Estimates.
Table 3. Income regression
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable
Income
Robustness 
check
Constant
20
(0.90)
0.82
(0.13)
Sex
-0.20
(0.07)
0.31
(0.12)
Single
-0.51
(0.06)
-0.13
(0.07)
African Brazilian
0.10
(0.14)
0.06
(0.13)
Years of Education
-0.09
(0.006)
0.006
(0.01)
Households number
(# numbers)
-0.003
(0.01)
-0.03
(0.03)
Land Title
0.25
(0.07)
0.23
(0.08)
R2 0.15 0.14
RootMSE 0.49 0.89
N 310 326
Source: Author’s Estimates.
Econometric results appear in Table 3. This 
study default estimates include the entire set of 
regressors consistent with the current theory regarding 
level of income and land title and the data collected 
during the survey. In such specification, the estimate 
of land title δ coefficient is 0.25, with a standard 
error of 0.07.
Such outcome is highly consistent with our 
hypothesis, that property rights (Land Title) increases 
level of income by fewer 0.25.
The Robustness part of the table provides our 
robustness check, adding (as mentioned previously) 
to the regression analysis, households that moved. 
The robustness outcome remains significant (0.23). 
Such result should help subsidize the conclusion that 
land title has a positive effect on the individuals not 
only on the property itself. Households that moved 
had the same trend towards level of income.
Hence, the effect land title, given the conditions 
and variables applied, is clearly positive, and helps to 
increase the level of income.
Conclusion
This paper has presented new evidence 
on the value of formal property rights in urban 
squatter community in a developing country. By 
studying the relationship between the exogenous 
acquisition of a land title and adult labor supply 
and income, the research has provided additional 
empirical support for the evidence that property 
title appear to increase household income.
Although existing studies indicate significant 
effect on access to credit, home investment, fertility 
and even income, especially by Field (2007) and 
Andrade (2006), this particular study aims helping 
to fill an important gap in the literature on property 
rights concerning the issue of isolating the causal 
role of ownership security.
Furthermore, the results indicate that unlike 
employment responses to most welfare programs, 
which tend to involve an income effect that 
potentially removes adult households from the 
labor force, government property titling programs 
appear to have the opposite effect.
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Regarding further research, it will certainly 
be interesting to apply the same survey in different 
locations and compare outcome results. Ravallion 
et al. (2005) argues that the same program works 
well in one village but fails in another. An example 
is the Bangladesh’s Food for Education Program. 
The program worked well in reaching the poor 
villages but not in others, even in relatively close 
proximity.
However, it is clear that understanding 
the multiple channels through which land titles 
influence economic outcome is a particular 
important given governments across the world 
are considering titling programs to address urban 
informality. In addition, the results have potential 
implications for understanding labor market 
frictions in developing countries (Goldsmith, 
1995). In places characterized by high levels of 
residential informality such as most of developing 
and poor countries, informal property protection 
may constitute an important obstacle to labor 
market adjustment and economic growth.
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